Abstract. Power Analysis has been deeply studied since 1998 in order to improve the security of tamper resistant products such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The study has evolved from initial basic techniques like simple and differential power analysis to more complex models such as correlation. However, works on correlation techniques have essentially been focused on symmetric cryptography. We analyze here the interests of this technique when applied to different smartcard coprocessors dedicated to asymmetric cryptography implementations. This study leads us to discover and realize new attacks on RSA and ECC type algorithms with fewer curves than classical attacks. We also present how correlation analysis is a powerful tool to reverse engineer asymmetric implementations.
Introduction
Public key cryptography has been widely used since its introduction by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] in 1976. Nowadays most famous applications are RSA [RSA78] , invented in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, and elliptic curves cryptosystems independly introduced by Koblitz [Kob87] and Miller [Mil86] .Both kinds of asymmetric schemes require arithmetic operations in finite fields. For instance the use of modular arithmetic is necessary for exponentiation primitive in RSA or DSA [NIS00] , as well as for point multiplication in elliptic curves. Therefore to obtain efficient computations, dedicated arithmetic coprocessors have been introduced in embedded devices.
For years tamper resistant devices have been considered as secure until 1996 when Kocher introduced the first side-channel attack (SCA) based on execution time measurements [Koc96] . A few years later power analysis was introduced by Kocher, Jaffe and Jun [KJJ99] . Their techniques, named simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA), threaten any naive cryptographic algorithm implementation. Because an electronic device is composed of thousands of logical gates that switch differently depending on the executed operations, the power consumption depends on the executed instructions and the manipulated data. Thus by analyzing the power consumption of the device on an oscilloscope it is possible to observe its behavior and then to deduce from this power curve some secret data. Later, in 1999, Messerges, Dabbish and Sloan [MDS99] applied DPA to modular exponentiation which is the heart of several public key algorithms. In 2004, Brier, Clavier and Olivier [BCO04] introduced correlation power analysis (CPA) with a leakage model. This method has proven its efficiency on symmetric key algorithms, and needs very few curves to recover a secret key compared to classical DPA.
In this paper, we focus on this technique for which application to asymmetric algorithms has not been yet publicly reported. We introduce new attacks, illustrated by concrete experiments, to apply CPA on these algorithms. Indeed any arithmetic operation can be threatened by correlation analysis. For instance, we show how to reveal on a single correlation curve the whole private exponent during RSA exponentiation, and even during RSA CRT exponentiations. In addition we introduce a new case for CPA: the ability to realize precise reverse engineering. Once secret implementation and component hardware design have been recovered more powerful attacks can be envisaged.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of asymmetric algorithms embedded implementations. Section 3 describes well-known SCA techniques related to this article. New applications of correlation analysis on public key algorithms are discussed in Section 4. Practical results on different smartcard coprocessors are presented, they validate our attacks and their efficiency compared to classical differential power analysis. In Section 5 we present another application domain of correlation analysis by describing how it can be used to realize reverse engineering. We conclude our research in Section 6.
Public Key Embedded Implementations
We introduce here principles used later in this paper: modular multiplication and exponentiation, especially the ones designed by Montgomery that are particularly suitable for embedded implementations, and the RSA public key cryptosystem.
Modular Multiplication
Chip manufacturers usually embed arithmetic coprocessors to compute modular multiplications x × y mod n for long integers x, y and n.
Montgomery introduced in [Mon85] an efficient algorithm named Montgomery Modular Multiplication. Other techniques exist: interleaved multiplicationreduction with Knuth, Barrett, Sedlack or Quisquater methods [Dhe98] .
Montgomery modular multiplication
Given a modulus n and two integers x and y, of size v in base b, with gcd(n, b) = 1 and r = b log b (n) , MontMul algorithm computes:
Step 4. Return(a)
Refer to papers [Mon85] and [KAK96] for details of MontMul implementation.
RSA
RSA signature of a message m consists in computing the value s = m d mod n. Signature s is then verified by computing m = s e mod n. Integers e and d are named the public exponent and the private exponent, n is called the modulus.
Some of the attacks introduced in this paper aim at recovering this private exponent d during decryption. Many implementations of the RSA algorithm rely on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) as it greatly improves performance in terms of execution speed, theoretically up to four times faster, cf. Alg. 2.2.. Algorithm 2.2. RSA CRT Input: p, q, dp, dq, iq = q −1 mod p: the private elements, m: the message Output: s: the signature
Step 1. Compute mp = m mod p and mq = m mod q
Step 2. Compute sp = m dp p
Step 4. Return(s)
In this case SCA is applied either to exponentiations to recover d p and d q , or to the recombination step to find q or to the initial reductions to recover p and q.
Modular exponentiation is the most time-consuming operation of RSA primitives. It is then essential to use an efficient method for exponentiation. Alg. 2.3. below, based on MontMul, gives the Montgomery exponentiation algorithm and is particularly suited for embedded RSA implementations.
For a given modulus n = (n v−1 n v−2 . . . n 1 n 0 ) b , we define r = b log b (n) and the following function f n :
Let x and y be integers such that 0 ≤ x, y < n, we denote x = f n (x) and y = f n (y). We have the following property: MontMul(x, y, n)=x×y×r mod n = f n (x×y) which is very useful to define the Montgomery modular exponentiation, cf. Alg. 2.3.. 
Step 1. a = r
Step 2. m = fn(m)
Step 3. for
Step 5. Return(a)
Power Analysis
Among the different side-channel analysis techniques, we present in this section DPA applied to modular exponentiation and recall the principles of CPA based on a Hamming distance linear model.
Differential Power Analysis on Exponentiation
We want to recover the secret exponent d during Alg. 2.3.. We explain here the Zero-Exponent Multiple-Data (ZEMD) attack from Messerges, Dabbish and Sloan [MDS99] . Suppose we know the u most significant bits of d; i.e. d k−1 . . . d k−u , and we want to recover the (u + 1) st bit of d. We make the guess d k−u−1 = g with g = 0 or 1, and we want to confirm this guess. We execute on the device to attack t executions of the algorithm with input messages m 1 . . . m t and collect the curves C 1 . . . C t corresponding to the power consumption of these executions.
Let S be the integer S = −1
) is defined and used to split the set of curves into two subgroups such as:
) (if the guess of g is correct). Then compute the differential trace T u+1 : 
. We refer the reader to Appendix C where differential trace results are presented.
Correlation Power Analysis
As published by Brier, Clavier and Olivier [BCO04] , it is known that CPA can be applied to obtain successful attacks on symmetric algorithms, for instance DES and AES, with fewer messages than classical DPA. The power consumption of the device is supposed to be linear in H(D ⊕ R), the Hamming distance of the data manipulated D, with respect to a reference state R. The linear correlation factor is used to correlate the power curves with this value H(D ⊕ R). The maximum correlation factor is obtained for the right guess of secret key bits.
Let W be the power consumption of the chip, its consumption model is:
The correlation factor ρ C,H between the set of power curves C and values
The principle of the attack is then the following: 
When the attacker makes the right guesses for values of the reference state R and secret leading to data D, the correlation factor ρ is maximum. It can also be seen graphically by tracing the correlation curve C ρ,g . Of course, peak(s) of correlation is (are) visible on C ρ,g when the guess is correct. The attacker has recovered a part of the secret value and a reference state during the execution. R can be an opcode value or a look-up-table address for instance.
Correlation Power Analysis of Asymmetric Implementations
Previous CPA publications were mainly focused on symmetric algorithms such as DES and AES. The use of CPA against public key implementations has never been publicly investigated, except for Joye who theoretically introduced its application to a second order attack in ECC [Joy04] . This is the subject of this section where we present new attacks based on CPA.
Correlation on Intermediate Value in Modular Exponentiation
When 
Step 1. Choose s ∈ {0, .., v-1}
Step 2. for u from 0 to k − 1 do
This attack can be optimized by simultaneously searching for many bits (α) of d, kind of α-ary CPA. In that case you have to compare 2 α − 1 correlation values, the maximum correlation value corresponding to the right guess of the α bits of d.
Reference state value:
The difficulty in correlation analysis is the knowledge of the reference state value R, which must be known or at least guessed by the attacker. The natural choice is to take R = 0. In that case the correlation Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 .)
The correlation peaks can appear either during the data handling of the guessed intermediate value leading to the output result of the current operation, or caused by setting this value as input operand of the next operation (for instance, in the next square). Therefore, there are two different possible sources of correlation.
Correlation on Multiplicand Data
The drawback of ZEMD CPA is that the attack must be iterated for each guessed bit of d (or even l-bit per l-bit), we need then to compute k (or k/l) correlation curves. A more efficient attack can be considered when the correlation peaks are caused by the handling of the input operand. Indeed, during an exponentiation, for each multiplication (as opposed to squarings), one of the multiplicands is constant and equal to m (or f n (m) for Montgomery). Therefore, by computing correlation on this multiplicand value we can expect to obtain CPA peaks each time it is manipulated. Thus all the multiplications by m (or f n (m)) could be seen on this single correlation curve. The full secret d is thus recovered with a single correlation computation on all the curves. This attack has been realized with success on different chips. Practical results for a partial and a full correlation on the multiplicand value during an exponentiation are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig.  4 . Indeed in Fig. 4 each multiplication can be seen on the correlation curve and as result d can be easily deduced as it would be done in SPA.
Algorithm 4.5. CPA on Multiplicand Data in Montgomery exponentiation
Input: n the modulus, m1, . . . , mt t messages Output:
Step 1.
Step 3. Compute ρ =ρC,A and its related correlation curve Cρ
Step 4. Detect on Cρ the peaks to identify all the multiplications and deduce d
Step 5. Return(d)
Correlation on RSA CRT
This section introduces new CPA attacks to recover the private key elements for each step of the Algorithm 2.2..
Correlation during CRT modular exponentiations
During modular exponentiations of message m j ; s p = m dp j mod p and s q = m dq j mod q, it is not possible to apply ZEMD because p and q are unknown to the attacker.
However it is possible to do correlation on the multiplicand's value to recover d p when m j < p and d q when m j < q. Choose m j < min(p, q) to recover simultaneously d p and d q . For instance if p and q are both k-bit primes, select messages m j in [2, 2 k−1 ]. Note that this attack is not applicable to RSA CRT using Montgomery exponentiation as f p (m j ) and f q (m j ) are unpredictable. However it can be done on other exponentiations, using different modular arithmetic such as Barrett.
Correlation during the CRT recombination
The recombination (Step 3 of Alg. 2.2.) gives the ability to guess bits of the value of q by CPA as s is known. Indeed, one can observe that for the upper half bits of s we have:
As (s p −s q )×i q mod p is an operand of the recombination step, it is then obvious that for the right guess of q we should be able to obtain the best correlation factor by estimating this operand value. In practice, the attack realization needs to guess the value of q by groups of b bits starting from the most significant words. For instance take b = 2 8 and the right guess of b bits of q corresponds to the highest correlation value obtained among the 256 guesses. For more details please refer to Alg. 4.6.. Step 1. q = 0
Step 2.
for
Step 3. Return(q)
as estimator gives the correct decision when the correct value belongs to g × b i , (g + 1) × b i + q. On our implementation based on a Montgomery multiplier, one should take into account that the estimation of A will depend on f n (see Paragraph 2.2).
Correlation during the initial reductions
Attacks on the initial reductions m mod p and m mod q would aim at recovering p and q. Previous studies have been presented by Boer, Lemke and Wicke [BLW02] and Akkar [Akk04] . Contrary to those previous attacks, CPA works with any messages and fewer curves on any arithmetic operation such as addition or subtraction. Indeed, for message reduction and no matter what the algorithm is, the first steps always require a subtraction and/or an addition between a part of the message and the secret modulus p or q. Note that even if the implementation is supposed to be protected against SPA, like the secure shift and reduce division algorithm [JV02] , it is possible to perform CPA. For example, if p has k bits and the messages used for CPA, m 1 , . . . m t , have 2k bits, the guesses will be performed on operands
All the bytes of p or q from the least significant bytes to the most significant ones can be retrivied using this technique.
Application to Elliptic Curves Cryptosystems
ECDSA and El Gamal are two of the most widely known elliptic curves schemes. For details we suggest the reader refer to Appendix A and [ACD + 06]. 
Practical Results and Remarks
All the attacks presented have been tested with success on several smartcard coprocessors using different modular arithmetic implementations, cf. Fig. 7 
Reverse Engineering
Side channel analysis has already been used by Novak [Nov03] and Clavier [Cla04] to reverse engineer secret GSM A3/A8 algorithms. Later Daudigny, Ledig, Muller and Valette processed similarly on a DES implementation [DLMV] .
Previously we showed that each data manipulation by the coprocessor could be observed by CPA. It has been used to recover secret keys and data in the previous analysis. We now show how CPA can also be used to recover the design of the coprocessor embedded in the chip.
In most software implementations, encryption and signature verification primitives do not implement any countermeasure as they do not manipulate secret data. Such primitives could then be used by an attacker to increase knowledge about the hardware multiplier. It could be useful as in software implementations, unsecure and secure primitives share the same hardware resources. Fig. 8 gives the details of the leakage of a hardware multiplier during a square operation in RSA exponentiation. By CPA, we are able to determine the precise implementation of the b-bit words multiplications in the modular multiplication algorithm: the size b of the hardware multiplier and the order in which the operands are used can be determined. We can precisely localize the instant when each data Fig. 8 illustrates part of the analysis we made on a chip using a Montgomery multiplier. We successfully recovered the size b of the hardware multiplier, the sequence and the kind of operations processed and thus the algorithm implemented for MontMul.
With such a precise knowledge, more complex attacks can be considered and achieved to defeat the classical DPA countermeasures. Indeed higher order power analysis attacks can also be envisaged with more precision on the cycles to combine together. In [Wal01] Walter introduced the Big Mac Attack to recover a secret exponent d only with the single power curve of the executed exponentiation. Such a reverse engineering by CPA gives the necessary knowledge required to realize this attack in the best conditions. Such information can also be used to recover secret variables in asymmetric algorithms based on private specifications when the basic structure of the algorithm is known. Of course this implies that the attacker also needs to learn about the implementation done: the kind of coordinates that are used for elliptic curves (projective, Jacobian), kind of modular arithmetic, etc.
Furthermore in a fault attack scenario, the benefit of such information cannot be neglected as the effect of each fault injection during hardware multiplier execution could become predictable and with a really precise effect.
To avoid risks of reverse engineering we advise randomizing public elements during the computations using techniques such as described in [Cor99] , [Koc96] .
Conclusion
Several new attacks based on CPA have been presented in this paper. These attack schemes threaten most of public key algorithms such as RSA, RSA CRT or Elliptic Curves ones (ECES, ECDSA) if efficient countermeasures, such as blinding technics, are not implemented. Through experiments, we have demonstrated that CPA can detect and characterize leakages of arithmetic coprocessors. Therefore it gave us the ability to successfully implement the attacks we present by using the power consumption model based on the Hamming distance between the handled data and a constant reference state. As results of these experiments, we have proven also that the use of CPA is an improvement compared to classical attacks such as DPA. The efficiency of CPA has led us to proceed to reverse engineering of the design of coprocessors and then it has given the knowledge of the type of algorithm implemented (Montgomery, Barrett, . . . ), the size of hardware multiplier, the way to interleave operations and words in the multiplication algorithm etc. Furthermore, we have stressed that such precise knowledge of an arithmetic coprocessors can make realistic high-order side channel attacks or even fault attack scenarios and improves their efficiency. Therefore, in order to avoid any potential attacker gaining experience on a secure device, we suggest using randomization techniques even for encryption or signature verification primitives usually considered as not sensitive. 
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